Lessons From the 1930s
It has become fashionable lately to draw a comparison between the world today and the 1930s. There are some striking similarities: the rapid military build up of an authoritarian state obsessed with redressing a period of national humiliation; the formation of a new Axis of dictatorships; invasions and conquest in Europe; isolationism and pacifism in America; greatly reduced military spending in the west. These comparisons only go so far - China is certainly not Nazi Germany, but human nature is the same now as it was 90 years ago, and as long as there have been humans, there have been wars.
I was interested in what we might learn from that inauspicious decade that could inform Australia’s defence policy, and recently read a brilliant account from the perspective of its greatest hero: Winston Churchill (The Last Lion Vol 2, W. Manchester). Churchill saw the coming danger and did everything he could to convince his countrymen to prepare for war. He was ostracized, universally opposed, yet never deterred. It was an extraordinary display of courage, integrity and perseverance.
Incredibly, I noticed that we seem to have forgotten many of the most important lessons of that period, and are repeating some of the same mistakes.
One lesson, especially relevant to a minor power such as Australia, is that we can by no means rely on security guarantees and alliances for our own defence, even from superpowers. In the 1930s, such guarantees were repeatedly given to Czechoslovakia by Britain and France, only to be reneged in the name of avoiding war. Guarantees were made to Poland, yet when they were invaded, the Allies declared war but then proceeded to do nothing against Germany, leaving Poland to its fate. Later in the war, Australia’s strategy, which amounted to throwing our lot in with the British at Singapore, ended in disaster and when the enemy was on our doorstep Britain was severely limited in the support it could provide. Were it not for Pearl Harbour, which gave the US a reason to defend Australia, our almost total reliance on Britain would have cost us our freedom.
The lesson we should take from this period is that although our alliance with the US is extremely important, we must also be prepared to defend ourselves without their help, and this should be the end to which the majority of our defence budget is directed. Our nuclear submarine plans appear to be Singapore 2.0: a massive allocation of defence resources to bolster allied forces operating far from our shores. Instead our goal should be what’s been described as an ‘Echidna Strategy’: making our country extremely difficult and costly to attack, for example by increasing our arsenal of missiles.
Throughout the 1930s, two inconvenient truths were plainly evident but fatally ignored: that Germany was undertaking a massive military buildup and that Britain’s defences were manifestly inadequate. Chamberlain is remembered as the chief appeaser, but it was Stanley Baldwin, prime minister during the crucial period from 1935-37 and puppet master before then, whose failure was the most damaging. He put winning elections ahead of national defence, and economic prosperity ahead of survival itself. His own departments warned him of the danger, but he hid it from a public who did not want war or talk of war. All was justified by a mistaken faith in the creed of appeasement: that war can be avoided if all reasonable demands of dictators are accommodated, and that a German people who do not war will avoid it if they can.
We are mistaken if we think such mistakes could never happen again. Although history has passed judgement on the doctrine of appeasement, wishful thinking abounds in our defence strategy. It is wishful thinking to say that war, if it comes, will not arrive in the 20 years it will take to get our submarines. It is wishful thinking to assume that if war occurs, the US will be willing and able to defend Australia. It is wishful thinking to hope that in wartime, as an island nation dependent on imports, we could withstand the disruption of shipping for more than a few weeks. It is sheer negligence to ignore what geography makes obvious: that our fate in a regional war is deeply intertwined not with far off allies, but with Indonesia.
I do not think that Xi Jinping has territorial ambitions outside a few disputed areas, nor do I believe the Chinese people want to go to war. Unfortunately, the same could be said of most of Germany including its generals during the 1930s. History has borne out that it is the nature of dictatorships that ruthless madmen frequently rise to the top, and if one such madman rises in China, he will inherit a military juggernaut backed by an industrial base that would be the envy of every despot in history. It is wishful thinking not to prepare for such a contingency.
AUKUS and the Quad are important initiatives in deterring aggression from China, but such alliances existed in the 30s and Hitler rightly judged they would lack the nerve to challenge him when the crucial time came. The situation in Ukraine has established a new pattern: smaller neutral democracies will be aided but not defended by the Western powers. This doctrine has had mixed results but at least Putin has been partially thwarted. It’s possible that the best deterrent we can offer to China is not the rather hollow threat of direct military confrontation, but the very real threat of extensive military aid being provided to any country that is invaded. For this to be a credible threat, the West’s resolve in supporting the Ukraine war must not be shaken, not only for the sake of Ukraine itself, but for the sake of the precedent it sets and the message it sends to any would-be aggressors in the coming years. The slow delivery and the strings attached to Ukrainian aid - particularly that it not be used for striking Russian targets - serve only to diminish the deterrent and make future conflicts more likely.
Churchill is remembered chiefly as a great wartime leader, but it was his efforts during the 30s, his decade in the political wilderness with public opinion and most of his own party against him that showed the true greatness of the man. He knew that military strength, not diplomacy and compromise, is the only way to handle a dictator. The question we must ask ourselves is whether we will, like Churchill, see the world as it is and prepare accordingly, or persist in the convenient delusion that we are safe, and continue to spend our peace dividend until we realise the price was peace itself.